ABSTRACT
                        Statement 51 of the 2018 Social Security Funding Act (Article 51, Loi de Financement de la Sécurité Sociale, LFSS)  allows  for  pilot  experiment  that  derogate  from  standard  funding  and  organizational  rules  for  health care delivery organisations. These include two five-year pilot programs, one with a risk-adjusted capitation payment accorded to the characteristics of the patients concerned for ambulatory healthcare professionals  practising  in  Primary  Care  Teams  (Paiement  en  équipe  de  professionnels  de  santé  en  ville, PEPS)  and  another  one  with  additional  financial  incentives  combining  advanced  payment  and  shared  savings aiming to improve coordination between hospital and primary care teams (Incitation à une prise en charge partagée, IPEP). Both aim to change the way in which primary healthcare is funded in France; primary  care  has  hitherto  largely  been  provided  by  self-employed  healthcare  professionals  who  are  mainly paid on a fee-for-service basis. However, to implement these developments at the local level, the executive teams of the pilot program in the Ministry of Health and the French National Health Insurance Fund  (Caisse  nationale  de  l'Assurance  maladie,  CNAM)-have  to  coordinate  two  objectives:  dealing  with  the issues faced by the health care professionals and executive teams of the program in the scheme in order to experiment together, while creating generalisable schemes that will benefit as many healthcare teams  as  possible  and  that  are  adapted  to  the  constraints  of  the  health  system.  How  do  the  executive  teams of the pilot program coordinate these two dimensions? 
                        This study is based on a qualitative methodology involving an analysis of documents and around thirty semi-structured  interviews,  conducted  between  October  2019  and  June  2021  (see  Inset  Source  and  Method).  It  shows  how  the  executive  teams  have  organised  themselves  to  conduct  pilot  projects  and  break away from standard practice, by first describing the way in which the scheme under Article 51 and the pilot programs were devised. Then an analysis of the procedures used to select the experiment teams and the process of drawing up the specifications, which will precisely define the pilot economic models, highlights  how  the  framework  of  interaction  between  healthcare  professionals  and  the  public  autho-rities is being renewed.
 See also  Questions d'économie de la santé n° 261 in French: Renouveler l'action publique en santé : un article (51) pour expérimenter avec les organisations de santé.